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Abstract When will a vote-seeking government pursue unpopular welfare reforms that are
likely to cost it votes? Using a game-theoretical model, we show that a government enacts
reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times, but not during
good ones. The key reason is that voters cannot commit to re-elect a government that does
not reform during bad times. This voters’ commitment problem stems from economic voting,
i.e., voters’ tendency to punish the government for a poorly performing economy. The voter
commitment problem provides an explanation for the empirical puzzle that governments
sometimes enact reforms that voters oppose.
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JEL Classification D72 · D78 · H11 · H5 · I38 · J48
1 Introduction
Public opinion research shows that the cards are very much stacked in favor of the welfare
state status quo. A majority of voters, including the median voter holding the median policy
preference, value core welfare programs such as public pensions and unemployment benefits
and prefer to uphold the status quo rather than cutting back these programs (Boeri et al.
2002; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Brooks and Manza 2007; Van Groezen et al. 2009).
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Consequently, vote-seeking political parties have the best chance of attaining their vote-
seeking goal when they refrain from reforming these programs in the direction that the
median voter dislikes. This political obstacle to reform is one of the central explanations
for why welfare states remain remarkably stable despite mounting pressures for change,
like ageing populations and globalization (e.g., Pierson 2001; Brooks and Manza 2007).
Notwithstanding the serious political obstacles to reform, many governments in advanced
democracies have pursued reforms that are unpopular, such as increasing the pension age
or cutting back benefits. Recent examples of reforms that do not benefit the median voter
include the reduction of the level of public pensions and/or wages of civil servants in Ireland,
Greece and the Netherlands.
When do governments pursue unpopular reforms? When are they willing to accept the
electoral risk involved? These questions have arrived at the forefront of the comparative
literature on the welfare state (see e.g., Starke 2006; Vis 2010), but are not answered satis-
factorily yet. Most studies simply assume that when governments get the chance to reform,
for instance because the institutions allow it, they will do so. When reforms are unpopular
with most voters, the government will turn to so-called blame avoidance strategies to try to
shift responsibility for the reform (e.g., Weaver 1986; Vis and Van Kersbergen 2007). One
possible blame avoidance strategy is to find a scapegoat, like the European Union (EU).
Another is to gather the support of opposition parties for the reform, leaving voters with
nowhere else to turn. While providing useful insights into how unpopular reforms can be
implemented, this literature leaves unexplained why some governments enact unpopular re-
forms and turn to blame avoidance strategies, while other governments do not enact these
reforms at all.
We contribute to this scholarly debate by proposing a mechanism that simultaneously
explains the occurrence and timing of welfare program reforms that are unpopular with
the median voter.1 While there exists much political-economic literature on the commitment
problem faced by politicians, the mechanism we propose is based on a commitment problem
faced by voters. We present a simple game-theoretical model that formalizes how economic
voting leaves voters unable to commit to re-elect a government that will not reform during
times of economic hardship. If voters vote economically, they—correctly or not—at least
partly blame their government for weak economic performance (Tufte 1978; Hibbs 1979;
Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Van der Brug et al. 2007). The voters’ commitment prob-
lem means that a vote-seeking government will consider reforms only when it will likely be
voted out of office anyway because of economic hardship. The central empirical implication
of our model is therefore that unpopular reforms will generally take place during economic
downturns. This implication is consistent with the work of, for instance, Høj et al. (2006).
Focusing on 21 OECD-countries between 1975 and 2003, Høj and colleagues find that eco-
nomic crises, operationalized as output gaps larger than four per cent, are associated with
more reform in both the labor market and the product market (see also Pitlik and Wirth 2003;
Vis 2010).
The article’s structure is as follows. We first discuss the comparative welfare state and
political-economic literature on welfare program reforms and argue that this literature does
1Our model applies to those reforms that negatively affect the median voter. In the current context of ‘perma-
nent austerity’ (Pierson 2001), most reforms are either of this type or what Vis (2010) labels ‘not-unpopular
reforms’. The latter are reforms that the median voter does not dismiss, but which are also not popular in that
they positively affect her voting decision (like active labor market policies). Welfare reforms that are popular
in that they positively affect the median voter are rare, if not absent, nowadays. For instance, the adoption of
family policies in many developed democracies over the past years does not get the support of the median
voter, who is too old to benefit directly and does not behave socio-tropically on this issue.
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not adequately account for the occurrence, and especially the timing, of reforms that are
unpopular with the median voter. We then introduce the game-theoretical model, and analyze
a special case that provides some intuition on the mechanism at work. We subsequently
analyze the general model, which we finally extend to allow for the possibility that reform
positively influences future economic conditions. We end with some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
When do unpopular welfare program reforms occur, i.e., reforms that the median voter dis-
likes? That is to say, what is their timing? The answers put forward in the comparative
welfare state literature and the political-economic literature on reform do not fully explain
reforms’ timing, as we show below.
2.1 Comparative welfare state research
A first body of comparative literature on unpopular welfare programs’ reforms argues
that the main cause for pressure on the welfare state—and thereby for reform—is socio-
economic change and the ensuing rise in the number of eligible recipients (Garrett and
Mitchell 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001; Iversen 2005). This argument
makes sense theoretically. For example, if population ageing is projected to lead to bud-
getary problems, the government may take measures to deal with the issue. However, the
socio-economic account provides little theoretical footing as regards when exactly such mea-
sures are taken. When do governments pursue cutbacks that may be necessary, but which
are also electorally risky? Why do some ‘objective’ problems lead to reform yet others do
not?
A second perspective on welfare programs’ reform focuses on political struggles, some-
times integrating socio-economic variables too. The argument is that the variation in the
degree and type of reform is influenced by the partisan complexion of the government (e.g.,
Korpi and Palme 2003; Allan and Scruggs 2004) or by the dynamics of party competition
(e.g., Kitschelt 2001; Green-Pedersen 2002). While offering useful insights into some of the
factors that hinder or facilitate reform, this account cannot explain when governments en-
gage in electorally risky activities. Why, for example, have unpopular measures been taken
by some right-wing and by some left-wing governments in Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, but not by others (see Vis 2009)?
A third body of comparative literature on unpopular welfare reform focuses on the in-
fluence of institutions. The usual argument is that reform occurs most often in countries
with fewer institutional hurdles and, therefore, highly concentrated political power. Reform
consequently should be more likely in Westminster countries (such as the United Kingdom)
than in political systems where governmental power is fragmented (like Switzerland and the
United States). Several empirical studies support this hypothesis (e.g., Bonoli 2001). How-
ever, some authors note that the reverse relationship is also plausible (see Ross 1997). Polit-
ical systems concentrating political power also concentrate political accountability. Conse-
quently, ‘(. . .) voters know very well who they may blame for unpopular cutbacks’ (Starke
2006: 109). In political systems where power is fragmented, conversely, avoiding blame for
unpopular measures is easier (Weaver 1986; Pierson 2001), possibly causing more cutbacks.
The institutionalist approach has been helpful in explaining the cross-national variation in
welfare reform. However, it cannot explain the when of reform because governments in the
same country face the same institutional constraints and opportunities (Armingeon et al.
2010), yet display various degrees of reform.
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A final strand of literature proposes that ideas matter for welfare programs’ retrench-
ment. The argument here is that by invoking a specific discourse or imperative, governments
may overcome the barriers to unpopular reform and implement it successfully (Cox 2001;
Schmidt 2002; see Campbell 2002; Lieberman 2002). Studies focusing on the importance
of ideas have added to the knowledge of the process of unpopular welfare reform. However,
this literature offers little theoretical foothold on when ideas matter (see Lieberman 2002).
2.2 Public choice literature on the welfare state
Next we discuss the political economy of the welfare state. Congleton et al. (2011) give
a recent overview of this literature. They discuss political-economic explanations for the
expansion of the welfare state in the twentieth century, when government expenditure as a
fraction of GDP rose sharply in most OECD countries. Congleton and colleagues distinguish
two political-economic explanations for this growth. The first strand of literature emphasizes
the role of preferences of voters and the political institutions that map these into policy
outcomes. A second approach stresses the importance of interest groups and lobbying.
An influential and seminal contribution in the first field is Browning (1975), who uses
a median voter model in the context of overlapping generations. Browning shows why a
democracy may overspend on social security. When the median voter is middle-aged, she
will regard past contributions as sunk while all benefits still lie ahead. When voting on
social security, the middle-aged median voter thus considers all benefits but not all costs,
resulting in an inefficiently high level of pension expenditure. Other papers have extended
this argument (e.g., Tabellini 2000) or added nuance to it (e.g., Sjoblom 1985, see Galasso
and Profeta 2002 for an overview of the political economy of social security). Meltzer and
Richard (1981), for example, apply the median voter model to taxation, with the result that
redistributive taxes are higher when the distance between the median and the mean income
is larger. Other important theoretical political-economic work includes Barro (1979), Besley
and Coate (1997), and Congleton and Bose (2010), who find that ideology is an important
explanation for the size of the welfare state, and Persson and Tabellini (2000), who propose
that presidential regimes spend less on welfare than parliamentary ones. Empirical contri-
butions on the determinants of social security include Breyer and Craig (1997), Tepe and
Vanhuysse (2009), and Mulligan et al. (2002).
The second stream of literature highlights the role of interest groups and lobbying. Impor-
tant seminal contributions in this field include Becker (1983), Olson (1965), and Grossman
and Helpman (1996). These scholars emphasize that the benefits and costs of social wel-
fare programs are distributed unevenly and asymmetrically, so a minority may gain from a
particular program while the losses associated with paying for it are spread over the ma-
jority. Contributors therefore do not face high losses individually, while beneficiaries have
strong incentives to lobby for welfare programs. When doing so, they need to overcome
the free-rider-problem by mobilizing own group members and coordinating their (voting)
behavior. A related and influential model of Niskanen (1971) postulates that lobbying may
also come ‘from the inside’, with civil servants pushing for higher budgets, as that increases
their reputation and job opportunities.
The two approaches can be distinguished analytically but are hard to disentangle empir-
ically. Still, Congleton and Shughart (1990) test the explanatory power of both approaches
for the development of the welfare state. Their main outcome is that electoral demand (of
the median voter) explains the development of social security in the United States better
than political push (of special interest groups) does.
This large and established literature focuses mainly on explaining the existence and/or
expansion of the welfare state. We contribute to this literature by considering if, how, and
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when welfare state programs are rolled back. With an ever older population, median voter
models, for example, have difficulty explaining why (and if so, when) retirement benefits are
lowered. The model we present is a game-theoretical one in the spirit of Acemoglu (2003).
Where Acemoglu focuses on the commitment problem of politicians, we instead focus on
a commitment problem of voters. As we elaborate below, the latter commitment problem
provides a natural explanation of the existence and timing of welfare program reforms.
3 A new mechanism: voters’ commitment problem
We propose a new mechanism, labeled voters’ commitment problem, to account for the tim-
ing of unpopular reforms of welfare programs in democratic systems. The thrust of the
argument is that, due to economic voting, voters cannot commit to re-elect a government
that refrains from reform when the economy is in a poor state. Owing to this commitment
problem, reforms of welfare programs take place during economic downturns only.2 Elec-
tions come with a pre-election commitment problem on the part of politicians, since they
cannot commit themselves to implement the policies they support on the campaign trail.
When in office, they may use their power to renege on their pre-election promises to voters.
The crucial aspects of elections, the ability to ‘throw the rascals’ out at the next election,
partly solves this commitment problem.
There is a similar commitment problem between elections on the side of the voters. This
problem results from economic voting. Voters generally oust a government during an eco-
nomic recession because they blame politicians, at least partly, for the economy’s poor per-
formance. There is a widespread consensus that economic voting is ‘a generalized phe-
nomenon in industrial democracies’ (Pacek and Radcliff 1995: 44; see Van der Brug et al.
2007). Moreover, Easaw (2010) shows that news (good or bad) about unemployment shapes
voters’ perceptions (positive or negative) of a government’s macroeconomic competence.
Due to the omnipresence of economic voting, the pledge of the median voter before the
election to re-elect the government if it refrains from an unpopular reform is therefore not
believable and certainly not enforceable. Consequently, a vote-seeking government might
reform during a recession because this reform will hardly influence its reelection prospects.
Governing parties are trapped between being punished for economic mismanagement or for
retrenching the welfare state (Green-Pedersen 2002). This also means that those govern-
ments who may not favor reform intrinsically have an incentive to pursue cutbacks if they
expect that such reform may boost economic performance in the longer run.
To formalize the argument, we propose a tractable game that captures economic voting
and the commitment problem that comes with it in a simple way. First, we discuss the players
and their preferences (Sect. 3.1), along with the assumptions of the model (Sect. 3.2). Then,
2This mechanism differs from political-economic explanations that focus on the absence of reform. That
literature typically assigns reform’s absence to the ‘nonneutrality’ in the distribution of gains and losses in
society. Reform is non-neutral because the winners from the status quo are assumed to be politically strong,
while the losers are politically weak. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) expand the argument, stating that it is
the uncertainty about the distribution of gains and losses that impedes reform. If some of the winners and
losers of the reform cannot be identified ex ante, the status quo is likely to prevail. In principle, reform and
its absence are two sides from the same coin. However, a number of important theories accounting for the
absence of reform fail adequately to explain its occurrence. Pierson’s (2001) argument that political obstacles
impede reform is one of them. Moreover, Fernandez and Rodrik’s (1991) work helps to explain better the
absence of reform than its presence, although the latter authors do specify a condition under which reform
occurs (certainty over the distribution of gains and losses).
438 Public Choice (2013) 155:433–448
we turn to the set-up of the model (Sect. 3.3) and present a special case that provides insight
and intuition about how elections can discipline politicians (Sect. 3.4). Then, we discuss the
most general version (Sects. 3.5 and 3.6) and, finally, an extension of the model (Sect. 3.7).
A game-theoretical model allows for formalizing the argument and thereby ensures its
internal consistency. The model’s logic may also lead to results not easily thought of other-
wise. For example, in the model political parties may face a coordination problem between
two equilibria (one reforming, the other not). This shows that postulating the voters’ com-
mitment problem does not just mechanically lead to presence of reforms during recessions
but reveals a more subtle potential problem in the democratic process, namely that the logic
of economic voting leads to the possibility of parties colluding or coordinating on reforms. It
would subsequently be interesting to operationalize this collusion empirically or think about
ways the democratic process could address this.
3.1 The players and preferences
Let us first discuss the preferences of the players in the game. There are three players:
two politicians and one voter (the median one). Focusing on one voter only may seem too
strict an assumption and one that does away too easily with voters’ possible heterogeneous
preferences regarding reform. Although we do not dismiss the fact the voters’ preferences
may very well vary, from the perspective of the governing party (or parties) the median
voter’s preferences are key. There is an extensive body of literature showing that mainstream
parties that typically make up the government cater to precisely this median voter (e.g.,
Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011). If the median voter opposes reform of one or more
welfare programs—either because it hurts her own consumption directly or because she
sociotropically cares about the income of welfare programs’ recipients—the reform entails
an electoral risk for the governing party (or parties).
There is ample survey research showing that the median voter and favor the status quo to
reform. Boeri et al. (2002), for example, find in a survey of the opinions on pension reform
in Germany and Italy that most voters, including the median one, oppose welfare reforms
and favor the state quo. Related, Van Groezen et al. (2009) find that a preference for the
status quo induces voters, again including the median one, to be wary of pension reforms,
even if these might improve their financial position in the longer term. Other scholars find
similar preferences as well for welfare programs other than pensions (e.g., Blekesaune and
Quadagno 2003; Brooks and Manza 2007). In general, reform typically means that the me-
dian voter incurs direct, (almost) immediate costs while the possible benefits are dispersed
and often arise only in the long(er) run. Based on a survey experiment among American
citizens, Jacobs and Matthews (2008) show that the uncertainty of a reform’s long-run ben-
efits is an important factor affecting whether citizens are willing to accept short-run pain
(the reform) for longer-term gain (the reform’s distant, positive consequences). Specifically,
the less the government can be trusted to produce these longer-run positive effects, the more
negative voters are about incurring short-run costs. In the context of welfare state reform that
negatively affects the median voter in the short-run—the reforms we focus on here—this is
an important point. There is always a real possibility that a proposed reform fails to lead to
the expected outcomes. For instance, an increase in the age of pension eligibility may lead
to more stable and lower public expenditures in the longer run, thereby positively affecting,
for instance, the rate of economic growth. However, economic growth is influenced by many
factors other than public spending alone, and most if not all of these factors are beyond the
direct control of any government. In this example, while the rate of economic growth—and
the consumption possibilities of voters—may have been even lower without raising the re-
tirement age because the effect of the reform in the longer-run is not visible or the longer-run
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gain is small. Jacobs and Matthews (2008) also show that voters’ cognitive capacity to rea-
son inter-temporally is rather low. It is this cognitive limited capacity that underlies voters’
attitude of such inter-temporal trade-offs. Therefore, we propose that voters will in general
be unwilling to accept welfare state reforms that hurt them in the short-run and which yield
only uncertain (and dispersed) longer-run benefits.
Against this backdrop, reforming one or more welfare programs is politically risky and
something one would theoretically expect vote-seeking parties to steer away from. In our
model, we set out to identify those conditions under which vote-seeking parties reform
nonetheless. Our focus on two politicians, who can be seen as two political parties, means
that our model applies directly to two-party systems such as the United States (US), Malta
or—to a lesser extent—the United Kingdom (UK).
What are the players’ utility functions? The two politicians both have a time-additive
utility function, Vt , with a one-period utility function U(xi) that is concave and positive and
where xi represents consumption at time i. The discount rate is β . The utility-function at





At each point in time, one and only one politician holds office. If a politician is out
of office, she does not have any decision to make and utility is normalized to zero. If the
politician is in office, she receives a positive endowment w > 0.
The median voter also has a time-additive utility function with a well-behaved one period
utility function, denoted W(c). In each period the voter consumes cg in good economic
times and cb in bad economic times with cg > cb > 0. We assume, realistically as we argue
above, that the median voter dislikes reform. The negative effect of a reform equals θ of
consumption. This cost of reform is strictly positive. We think of this as the real costs of
reform to the median voter (not necessarily all voters) like a less generous pension benefit.
However, the costs can also be (re)interpreted (partly) as the psychological costs of any
deviation from the status quo. Research on habit formation shows that many people prefer
the status quo to change (the status quo bias).
The costs are positive but consumption in both economic circumstances remains positive,
so cg −θ > cb −θ > 0. Because the one-period utility function is increasing in consumption,
it follows that W(cg − θ) > W(cb − θ). The median voter’s preferences are therefore such
that under all circumstances she prefers no reform (the status quo) to reform. It is further
necessary to assume that reforms are the only (salient) issue in elections.
3.2 Assumptions of the model
Our model hinges on three assumptions. The first one is that reforms are unpopular among
the median voter. We have argued already that this is plausible. A second assumption is that
economic motives dominate voting decisions. This does not mean that economic voting is
equally strong in all democratic systems. In majoritarian systems, which typically have a
one-party government, it is clear who to blame for the economic failure. The higher clarity
of responsibility increases the likelihood that voters vote retrospectively (i.e., economically)
compared to in systems with lower degrees of clarity (like parliamentary ones; see Powell
and Whitten 1993 and Whitten and Palmer 1999). Since our game-theoretical model is clos-
est to a majoritarian system with a one-party government, the lower relevance of economic
voting in other electoral systems is not a problem. A final assumption is that governments
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Fig. 1 Timing of events
are primarily vote-seeking (Downs 1957), but that they can also be office-seeking or policy-
seeking. Herein we follow the behavioral literature on political parties (Strøm 1990; Müller
and Strøm 1999). In our model, a government faces a trade-off between (1) remaining in
office by catering to the wishes of the median voter, meaning that the government behaves
as a vote-seeker, and (2) exclusion from office by adopting a policy that goes against the
wishes of the median voter, indicating that the government acts more like a policy-seeker.
When facing sure electoral defeat the policy-seeking motive dominates since winning office
is no longer possible.
3.3 The stage-game
For both the politician in office and the median voter, the following game unfolds in three
stages:
1. There is a move by nature that determines the economy’s performance. With probability
λ the economic circumstances are good; with probability 1 − λ they are bad.
2. Next, the politician in office can choose between two actions. The first is to reform; the
second is to stick to the status quo (i.e., no reform). In the former case, the politician re-
ceives, in addition to w, a positive amount r > 0. This may be interpreted as her personal
benefits from reforming, for instance in the form of ideological satisfaction.
3. After observing the state of the economy and the action of the politician, the median voter
has the option to either re-elect the politician or not. If the politician is not re-elected, the
other politician is elected automatically. Figure 1 depicts the sequence of moves in the
three-stage game where the (re)installment of the new government at t = 4 ends it.
The politicians’ action space consists of two choices: reform or no reform. The median
voter’s action space also consists of two actions: re-election or no re-election. We restrict
the strategies and the equilibria of the players in several ways. First, we consider only pure
strategies. Second, we restrict attention to Markov equilibria. In Markov equilibria, players’
actions are a function of the current, payoff- relevant state. We define the economy’s state
as good or bad, ruling out the possibility that the players condition their actions on the
entire economic history or the history of others players’ actions. Third, as we assume the
two politicians to be identical; we consider only symmetric equilibria where both politicians
adopt the same strategy.3
For the politician, a strategy maps the state of the economy into the action reform or no
reform. A strategy thus consists of a pair that prescribes the action when the economy is in
a bad and in a good state, respectively. The voter has a strategy that maps the economy’s
performance and the action of the politician into the action re-election or no re-election. The
3The assumption of identical politicians does not imply that the political parties have identical preferences on
all other issues. It means only that both parties take the preference of the median voter into account in their
decision concerning welfare program reforms. As we elaborate in the main text, this is a plausible assumption.
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voter’s strategy therefore has to prescribe an action in four circumstances, conditional on the
state of the economy (either good or bad) and on the action of the politician (reform or no
reform).
3.4 Equilibria with perfect conditioning
First, we consider the situation where the voter can condition re-election perfectly on the
occurrence of reform. This is a special case of the general model we present later. Economic
circumstances are not relevant in this first model, which means that the voter’s optimal
strategy is to reelect a politician who does not reform and does not re-elect a politician who
does. Subsequently, there are two potential pure strategy equilibria; one with both politicians
always reforming and one with both politicians never reforming.
The equilibrium with both politicians always reforming occurs if the following condi-
tion (1) holds:4
U(w + r) − U(w) > β
1 − β U(w) −
β2
1 − β2 U(w + r) (1)
The left-hand side gives the immediate gain from reforming compared to not reforming. The
right-hand side gives the difference of the remaining lifetime utility of never reforming and
the lifetime utility of always reforming (given that the other politician always reforms). In
the latter case, both politicians are in office every second period and reform when they are.
Under condition (1), given that the other politician always reforms, it is best to do likewise.
As the two politicians are similar, this constitutes a Nash-equilibrium. Note that if β = 0,
the condition is always met, as r > 0. In that case, future income is not considered at all and
reforming is more attractive.
Another possible equilibrium is one with both politicians not reforming. A necessary
condition for such an equilibrium is:
U(w + r) − U(w) < β
1 − β U(w) (2)
Note that if β = 0, the condition is never met. This condition states that, given that the other
politician never reforms, never reforming and hence holding office forever after leads to
higher life-time utility than reforming once and never being (re)elected again.
Summarizing, there are three possibilities.
1. U(w + r)−U(w) is small, condition (2) is met and condition (1) is not met. This means
that the lifetime utility of always holding office is large. Reforming is not attractive,
even if the other politician does likewise. The equilibrium with both politicians never
reforming occurs.
2. U(w + r) − U(w) is large, condition (1) is met and condition (2) is not. The utility of
even a one-time reform is large and there will always be reform. In that case, there is no
way for the voter to discipline the politician by not reelecting her.
3. U(w + r) − U(w) has an intermediate value and conditions (1) and (2) are both met. In
this case both equilibria are possible. Which one occurs, depends on the ability of the
two politicians to coordinate on the equilibrium of both of them reforming. This latter
equilibrium provides both politicians with a higher lifetime utility than the equilibrium
where both never reform.
4Here and in the remainder of the article, we use the familiar convergence result of a geometric series.
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This third case is arguably the most interesting one, because it results in a coordination
problem where both politicians can agree on an action that benefits them but that is not in
the median voter’s interest. As indicated, such a situation is perfectly reconcilable with a
democratic process and vote-seeking parties because of voters’ commitment problem. The
outcome is then that both parties constantly pursue reforms the median voter dislikes. If
politicians indeed coordinate successfully, a further strategy of the voter could be to never
re-elect one of the two politicians once she reformed and to always re-elect the other one,
irrespective of that politician reforming or not. With such a voter’s strategy, the politician
aims for the strategy of no reform.
Note that it is impossible for both conditions not to be met, since the right-hand side of
condition (2) is larger than the right-hand side of condition (1).
3.5 Equilibria with economic voting
We now turn to the model’s more general and more realistic version wherein the voter can
only condition re-election imperfectly on the action of the politician in office. As an extreme
case of economic voting, the politician is never re-elected when the economy is slowing
down, irrespective of whether she reformed. This constitutes the commitment problem of
the voter who cannot credibly commit to re-elect a government that does not reform. Con-
sequently, the politician will always reform during a recession. For the politician, reforming
does not alter the prospects of being re-elected while there is a positive pay-off r > 0. During
booms, a politician is still never re-elected after a reform, as before.
Again, two equilibria are possible. The web appendix (available at www.barbaravis.nl)
shows the following necessary condition (3) for an equilibrium where both politicians will
not reform in good times; this is the analogy of condition (2):
U(w + r) − U(w) < β(1 − λβ[λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w + r)]
1 − 2βλ − β2 + 2β2λ
− β
2(1 − λ)U(w + r)
1 − βλ − (1 − λ)β2 (3)
Note that condition (3) reduces to condition (2) if λ = 1. In this particular case, economic
circumstances are always positive and the voter can perfectly condition re-election on the
actions of the politicians. Note also that if β = 0, the condition never holds; in that case
either politician takes the future into account and they will therefore always reform.
For the equilibrium with both politicians reforming the necessary condition reads:
U(w + r) − U(w) > β
1 − βλ − (1 − λ)β2 [λU(w) + (1 − λ)U(w + r)]
− β
2
1 − β2 U(w + r) (4)
Note that, as before, condition (4) reduces to condition (1) if λ = 1. Note also that if β = 0,
the condition always holds.
In the web appendix, we show that the right-hand side of condition (3) is larger than the
right-hand side of condition (4). Therefore it is not possible for both conditions not to be met
and there is always at least one equilibrium. Generally, there are again three possibilities.
A unique equilibrium with both politicians always reforming; a unique equilibrium with
both never reforming during booms; and the possibility that there are two equilibria. Which
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Table 1 Comparative statics





one occurs in the latter case depends on which equilibrium the two politicians coordinate.5
The equilibrium where both reform has higher lifetime utility than the one where neither
reforms. This follows from the observation that condition (3) is met and it is then better not
to reform than to reform, given that the other politician does not reform. Condition (4) is also
met, implying that it is better to reform than not to reform, given that the other politician
reforms. It holds that not reforming when the other reforms yields greater lifetime utility
than not reforming when the other does not reform. In both cases, the politician has the same
income when in office and is only out of office after bad economic times. However, in the
latter case the probability of coming back into office is smaller, because the other politician
does not reform during booms. Combining these observations, we find that in the case of
multiple equilibria, the two politicians have higher lifetime utility in the equilibrium of both
reforming than of both not reforming. For the voter the opposite holds; the equilibrium with
both politicians not reforming increases her utility.
3.6 Comparative statics
We investigate the comparative statics to assess how the four different parameters in the
model influence the willingness to reform and the median voter’s ability to discipline the
politicians (see Table 1).
It can be shown that, ceteris paribus and for all w, condition (3) will more likely be
met when the endowment w increases, i.e., the right-hand side increases more than the left-
hand side. If the endowment increases, reform is less likely to occur. This follows because
reform leads to the loss of the endowment w in the next period and possibly in subsequent
periods. The larger is this loss, the less likely a politician reforms. This implies that an
increase in politicians’ income—the endowment w—decreases the probability of reforms
during prosperous economic times. The opposite holds for condition (4): the higher is w,
the less likely the condition is met and the less likely is an equilibrium with both politicians
reforming.
Furthermore, ceteris paribus and for all r , condition (3) will less likely be met when the
personal satisfaction from reform (r) increases; then the right-hand side then decreases more
than the left-hand side. The higher is r , the more likely reform is. This formalizes the idea
that a larger personal satisfaction from reform make undertaking reform more attractive. The
opposite holds for condition (4); the higher is r , the more likely the condition is met and the
more likely is an equilibrium with both reforming.
5This constitutes a classical 2 × 2 coordination game with two players (the two politicians) and two pure
strategies (either always reform or never reform during economic prosperity); see Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
The two pure strategy equilibria are that both players choose to always reform or that both players choose
not to reform. The first equilibrium Pareto dominates the latter, so when possible (for example with pre-play
communication), the players would coordinate on the equilibrium to always reform.
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For both conditions, the comparative statics of λ and β are not straightforward. The
partial derivative of the bound can be both positive and negative. This means that a larger
probability of economic hardship and a higher discount rate do not have an unambiguous
effect. Consider, for example, the equilibrium at which both politicians reform during good
economic times (and are voted out of office because of that). A higher subjective discount
rate increases the value of remaining in office as the expected future gains that come with
it increase. However, it also increases the discounted values of future reforms during good
times. These counteracting effects depend on the discount factor β in a non-linear way.
Neither of the effects dominates and thus the net effect can go either way. The sign depends
on the particular values of the parameters and the functional form of the utility function,
making general predictions of the effect impossible.
3.7 A positive effect of reform on economic conditions
The basic model postulates that reforms do not affect the economy except for a positive
endowment for the reforming politician—interpreted as the politician’s personal satisfaction
from reform (r)—and a one-time negative impact on the median voter. While this is enough
to capture the mechanism we focus on (the voter’s commitment problem), it does away with
the possibility that reforms eventually will increase (or decrease) welfare. One could, for
example, argue that pension reforms, although lowering the utility of the median voter, may
have a positive impact on the welfare of future generations (see e.g., Browing 1975).
To incorporate such effects fully, the probability of the economy being in a good state
should be dependent on all previous reforms. This can be handled in numerous and compli-
cated (non-linear) ways. This section considers the simplest version in which one and only
one reform leads to a one-time increase in the probability that the economy is in a good state
from λ to λ∗, with λ∗ > λ. First, we consider the median voter’s preferences and actions;
then we turn to the politicians’ strategies.
Thus far, the interpretation of the median voter was immaterial to the model’s outcomes.
When current actions affect future periods, the interpretation becomes important. Two inter-
pretations of the median voter are possible: (1) each period there is a different median voter
or (2) there is a long-lived player. If the median voter differs each period, and current young
or unborn voters are the future’s median voter, it is clear that at some point future voters
want a reform that results in λ∗ while the current median voter might not want a reform.
In these cases, reform benefits future (median) voters and current politicians, but not the
current median voter.
If, however, the median voter is interpreted as a long-lived player, she might also prefer a
one-time reform (and none thereafter) during economic prosperity to no reform at all if the
following condition is met:
W(cg − θ) + β1 − β [λ
∗W(cg) + (1 − λ∗)W(cb)]
> W(cg) + β1 − β [λW(cg) + (1 − λ)W(cb)] (5)
For this median voter there is a trade-off between the immediate negative impact, captured
by θ , and the future benefit of the reform, indicated by λ∗ > λ. However, beyond the first
reform the median voter does not want any further reforms due to the assumption that only
a one-time increase in λ is possible.
A politician facing a reform decision now not only faces the reform’s current gain (r),
but also the long-term impact given by λ∗. For now assuming that the median voter does not
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reelect a reforming government, the increase of λ is not to the politician’s advantage because
it lowers the probability of being in office any time soon. In the extreme case when λ∗ = 1,
the politician may never be in office again. The paradoxical situation may then result that




1 + β (1 − λ)β
(1 − 2βλ − β2 + 2λβ2)
]
> U(w + r) + β (1 − λ
∗)β[λ∗U(w) + (1 − λ∗)U(w + r)]
(1 − 2βλ∗ − β2 + 2λ∗β2) (6)
Expression (6) is derived under the assumption that the equilibrium with neither politician
reforming results after one reform (see the web appendix for the details). The model’s exten-
sion thus leads to a new equilibrium with both politicians never reforming, hereby expanding
the types of equilibria that can be rationalized. It is thus possible that future median voters
do want a one-time reform but this never happens because the reforming politician thereby
not only increases the probability that the economy prospers but also that the other politician
remains in office.
As indicated above, the median voter when interpreted as a long-lived player may how-
ever desire a reform if condition (5) is met. In that case the median voter may consider
re-electing a politician that reforms during an economic upswing (during busts the commit-
ment problem hinders this still) if this is the first reform. After any subsequent reform, the
median voter does not re-elect the reforming politician. This strategy will induce a politician
to reform because she now receives both the personal satisfaction from reforming and re-
mains in office. However, this will also trigger multiple reforms later on when times are bad,
which the median voter dislikes. The median voter will reward the first reform nonetheless
if the increase in λ is large enough. Formally, the following condition (7) is necessary for
the median voter to re-elect the first politician who reforms during a boom:
W(cg − θ) + β1 − β [λ
∗W(cg) + (1 − λ∗)W(cb − θ)]
> W(cg) + β1 − β [λW(cg) + (1 − λ)W(cb)] (7)
Expression (7) is derived under the assumption that the equilibrium with both not reforming
results after one reform. If, however, the equilibrium with both parties always reforming
results the condition becomes harder to fulfill as then the utility during good economic times
equals W(cg − θ) after a reform. Condition (7) describes the situation that voters prefer; for
example, a one-time reform to the pension system but reject incremental cut-backs.
As said, a more complicated relation between the number of reforms and the probability
λ is both possible and reasonable. The model can likewise be extended in several other
ways. More than two politicians could be considered, more policy issues or changing voter
preferences could be taken into account. This would strengthen the assumptions’ plausibility
and thereby the results’ validity. However, it would also make the model more complex,
making analytical solutions intractable if not non-existent.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Under what circumstances do vote-seeking governments pursue welfare program reforms
that are unpopular with the median voter and therefore likely lead to electoral punishment?
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Existing work in comparative welfare state research and the political economy of reforms
offer some helpful starting points, but do not provide a convincing answer to this question.
In this article, we presented a simple game-theoretical model to identify when politicians
pursue unpopular reforms and when they do not. We have shown that parties that primarily
seek votes can still opt to reform welfare programs, even though the median voter prefers
the status-quo. In the model, we stack the cards against reform by assuming that parties are
primarily vote-seeking and that the median voter opposes reform. Our model shows that even
in this reform-hostile setting, reform is possible. The most interesting outcome is that for a
relevant range of parameters the politicians face a coordination problem. Both politicians
in the model prefer to coordinate on an equilibrium where they both always reform. The
median voter is then worse off, but she cannot prevent reform because of the commitment
problem related to retrospective economic voting. An extension of the model allows the first
reform to increase the probability of future prosperity. It is then possible that the current
median voter favors reform. In that case, the median voter may support an initial reform that
increases future welfare but will oppose all subsequent reforms.
The result of our model helps to shed light on a theoretical puzzle in the literature on
unpopular reforms. Our model’s empirical implication is that policy reforms are initiated
during recessions, which is in line with the findings of, for example, Høj et al. (2006). Our
contribution lies in presenting the underlying theoretical mechanism at work: the occurrence
and timing of reforms spring from an intrinsic voter commitment problem.
The model’s empirical implication, reform occurring during economic downturns, also
identifies the condition under which an ‘objective’ socio-economic problem matters: socio-
economic dire straits. Assuming that voting is driven by economic performance, it is likely
that the incumbent party or parties will not be re-elected during times of recession, irrespec-
tive of their particular policy. Economic setbacks thus allow a government to act against the
wishes of the median voter, because the government knows it is almost surely headed for
electoral defeat regardless of its actions. Our findings also contribute to the literature that ex-
amines the impact of ideas on reform by indicating that a poor socio-economic state enables
politicians to act based on their own ideas or interests. With respect to studies focusing on
partisanship, our model shows that the government’s color is irrelevant, as both leftist and
rightist politicians face a median voter who opposes welfare program reform. The empirical
work of, for instance, Vis (2010) corroborates this prediction.
Our model with two politicians and one voter (the median one) is appropriate for ad-
vanced democracies with a two-party system and a majority, plurality or one-party govern-
ment. The number of such countries is limited as most have more than two parties (although
a single-party government will still typically emerge when there are relatively few parties).
In future work, it would be interesting to expand the number of parties included in the model.
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